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Abstract
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose
to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of
a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on
the degree of substitutability in the equilibrium. Focusing on the case of substitute goods,
we show that Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than
Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively
small (respectively, large). Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage
of the game. As a result, Singh and Vives’ ranking of social welfare is reversed in a range
of substitution values for which it is a dominant strategy for public firm to choose either
quantity or price contracts.
JEL: C7, D43, H44, J51, L13.
Keywords: Wage Bargaining, Union, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
1 Introduction
Recently, the economic implications of the mixed oligopoly market have been an issue with
respect to the change in competition for market structure efficiency. This means that public firms
still play an important role in most economic realms. This mixed oligopoly with private firms
is common in many countries; industries such as oil, heavy manufacturing, telecommunications,
and tourism are good examples of mixed oligopolies. There is a lot of existing literature that
describes studies of mixed oligopolies1; however, that literature has largely ignored the strategic
variables that private and public firms can choose in order to set prices or quantities. The few
studies that have considered strategic variables are Singh and Vives (1984), Zanchettin (2006),
Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) and Lo´pez (2007), who discuss pure Cournot and Bertrand competition
when all firms compete among private firms2. These works, which deal with the choice of
strategic variables for prices or quantities, suggest important implications in the determination
of market outcome. However, none of these papers has considered the case in which both private
and public firms choose to set prices or quantities in a mixed duopoly. Thus, the present paper
will be modeled around the noncooperative game, in which the choice of strategic variables is
set in a unionized mixed duopoly.
In a pure duopoly, Singh and Vives (1984) first show that Bertrand competition is more
efficient than Cournot competition when goods are differentiated. Their study determines that
Cournot equilibrium profits are greater than Bertrand equilibrium profits when goods are substi-
tutes, and vice versa when goods are complements. They establish that when private firms play
the downstream duopoly game without unions’ wage bargaining, it creates a dominant strategy
for private firms in a pure duopoly to choose quantity contracts if goods are substitutes. In game
∗Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Jangjeon-dong, Geumjeong-gu, Pusan
609-735, Republic of Korea, Tel:+82-51-510-2532; Fax:+82-51-581-7144; E-mail: choipnu@pusan.ac.kr
1See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) and Nett (1993) for general reviews of the mixed oligopoly models. For
recent literature on mixed oligopoly, see Barcena-Ruiz (2007), Matsumura (1998), Matsumura and Kanda (2005),
Matsumura and Matsushima (2004, 2006), Lu and Poddar (2006), etc.
2In this paper, we use “pure Cournot and Bertrand competition in duopoly” when all firms are private firms
in order to distinguish the concept of mixed duopoly.
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theory terms, a variety of strategic settings has emerged based on the choice of strategic vari-
ables, such as occurs in Cournot versus Bertrand equilibrium. Based on the framework of Singh
and Vives (1984), Cheng (1985) establishs more general results in geometric analysis. Ha¨ckner
(2000) extends the standard model of vertical product differentiation. In addition, by adding
different assumptions into Singh and Vives’ (1984) framework, Dastidar (1997) explores the
fact that in a homogeneous product market, Bertrand equilibrium prices may not be lower than
Cournot equilibrium prices if they fall under the equal sharing rule with asymmetric costs. Many
works that address oligopoly models include those of Qiu (1997), Lambertini (1997), Okuguchi
(1987), Amir and Jin (2001), among others. On the other hand, by enlarging the parameter
space considered by Singh and Vives (1984) to allow for a wider range of cost and demand
asymmetry, Zanchettin (2006) finds that Singh and Vives’ (1984) result that firms always make
larger profits under quantity competition than under price competition fails to hold3.
Along these lines, we address the issue of whether or not the standard results of the ranking
of Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes under differentiated duopoly hold up in the
case of a unionized mixed duopoly. More specifically, we illustrate the way in which the choice
of strategic variables to set prices or quantities affects social welfare in a mixed duopoly. In
addition, a comparison is made between the social welfare of a unionized mixed duopoly and
the choice of strategic variables.
There have been some attempts to introduce union utility into a model of the choice of
strategic variables to set prices or quantities, namely Lo´pez (2007) and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004).
Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differen-
tiated duopoly, in which wages are paid by each downstream in the outcome of a strategic
bargain with its upstream labor union. They show that Singh and Vives’ (1984) result holds
unless unions are powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility
function. Lo´pez (2007) analyzes the more general case of profit-maximizing upstreams that sell
input to a duopoly in exchange for a negotiated input price4. The papers that are closest to
the present model of unionized mixed duopoly are authored by De Fraja (1993a), Haskel and
Sanchis (1995) and Haskel and Szymanski (1993). Furthermore, Ishida and Matsushima (2008a)
analyzed the optimal framework, focusing on wage regulation that is imposed on both the public
firm and the union.
Yet, recent developments in literature have not investigated the issue of how private and
public firms play the noncooperative game of choosing strategic variables in the context of wage
bargaining in a mixed duopoly. Consequently, our paper differs from previous works on unionized
mixed oligopoly, which focused on privatization without public and private firms’ choice of
strategic variables. This paper investigates a mixed duopoly in which the private and public
firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process.
3Wang (2008) shows that while profit ranking between price and quantity competition can be partially reversed
the traditional result by Singh and Vives (1984) that firms always choose a quantity in a two-stage game continues
to hold in the enlarged parameter space.
4On the other hand, Manasakis and Vlassis (2006) extends Singh and Vives’ (1984) framework that there
is no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract which each firm will offer consumers. In the context of a
unionized symmetric duopoly, they argue that the mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the one
that entails the most beneficial outcome for both the firm and its labour union, given the choice of the rival
firm/union pare. In addition, motivated by the institutional diversity of unionization structures and the growth
of foreign direct investment (FDI), the current bargaining process between firms and unions has been developed
independently. As identified by Naylor (1998, 1999), Zhao (1995), Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Haucap and Wey
(2004), and Leahy and Montagna (2000), the amount of domestic production is decided through union bargaining
when a firm undertakes FDI. In another related paper, the relationship between the amount of production and
the union has been explored among domestic private firms (Naylor, 2002). There are many studies considering
unionized international oligopoly, see for instance, Straume (2003), Ishida and Matsushima (2008b), Mukherjee
and Suetrong (2007) and references therein.
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In accordance with Singh and Vives (1984) and Lo´pez (2007), we analyze a noncooperative
three-stage game in which two firms produce differentiated goods. Although previous analyses
such as Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) and Lo´pez (2007) on the union’s utility focused on collective
bargaining in pure ologopoly, they did not analyze union utility in the mixed duopoly.
The timing of the game of the present paper is as follows. In the first stage, the private and
public firms simultaneously commit to choosing a strategic variable for either price or quantity,
that is a type of contract, to set in the unionized mixed duopoly. In the second stage, each union
independently bargains over its wages, keeping in mind each strategic variable of the private and
public firms. In the third stage, each firm chooses its quantity or price simultaneously, in order
to maximize its objective knowledge of the strategic variable of the public and private firms
and of the wage levels in previous stages. Given this three-stage game model, we show that
only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of substitutability
in the equilibrium, regardless of the choice of the private firms’ strategic variable. Moreover,
such strategic choice commitment by public firm can either worsen or improve social welfare
when all firms choose different types of contracts. While there is a dominant strategy for the
public firm to choose Bertrand or Cournot contracts contingent on the degree of substitution,
there is not a dominant strategy for private firms. This result contrasts with Singh and Vives’
conclusion (1984), in which a dominant strategy for the private firms in a pure duopoly is to
choose the quantity contract if goods are substitutes. This occurs because we relinquish Singh
and Vives’ assumption and treat the type of contract as it exists in a unionized mixed duopoly.
Thus, a private firm’s profit is determined by a public firm’s choice of contract. As a result, the
endogenous type of contract is determined by public firms, regardless of their choice of private
firms’ strategy. There is thus a range of substitution values for which it is a dominant strategy
for public firm to choose either a quantity or price contract; hence, we show that when goods
are substitutes, Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than
Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small
(respectively, large). Furthermore, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of
the game.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one work has attempted to compare Bertrand
and Cournot outcomes in the mixed oligopoly: Ghosh and Mitra (2008). More specifically,
Ghosh and Mitra (2008) derive their results comparing Counot and Bertrand competition in
the mixed oligopoly where the endogenous type of contract is not determined by public firm,
and there exists no union trade in the mixed oligopoly. Hence, Ghosh and Mitra (2008) show
that the ranking of social welfare is exogenously determined. The theoretical results of the
present study, however, treat the problem at the differentiated mixed duopoly in which private
and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining
process. Thereofore, our paper differs from the existing literature in at least two important ways.
First, the existing studies in mixed oligopoly considered exogenous type of contract rather than
endogenous type of contract. Second, previous works focused on reversal result in Cournot-
Bertrand profit differential in pure oligopoly market, while our paper investigates not only the
case in which both private and public firms choose to set prices or quantities depending on
the degree of substitutability but also how social welfare are affected by the type of contrat
structure.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Section
3 presents fixed-timing games regarding the type of contract and determines firms’ endogenous
choice of strategic variable. Concluding remarks appear in Section 4.
3
2 The Basic Model
The basic structure of our research is a differentiated duopoly model, which is a simplified
version of Singh and Vives’ model (1984). Consider two single-product firms producing differ-
entiated products that are supplied by a public firm 0 and a private firm 1. We assume that the
representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function given by
U = xi + xj − 12
(
x2i + 2cxixj + x
2
i
)
,
where xi denotes the output of firm i = 0, 1. The parameter c ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the degree
of substitutability among goods. Thus, the inverse demand is characterized by
pi = 1− cxj − xi; i 6= j, i = j = 0, 1, (1)
where pi is firm i’s market price and xi denotes the output of firm i = 0, 1. Hence we can obtain
the direct demands as
xi =
(1− c) + cpj − pi
1− c2 (2)
provided that quantities are positive.
To analyze the union’s wage bargaining, we also assume that the public and private firms
are unionized, and wages wi, i = 0, 1 are determined as a consequence of bargaining between
firms and unions. Let w denote the reservation wage. Thus, we assume that the union sets the
wage while public and private firms decide the level of employment unilaterally. Taking w as
given, the union’s optimal wage setting strategy wi regarding firm i is defined as
ui = (wi − w)θxi where i = 0, 1. (3)
As Haucap and Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000) and Lommerud et al. (2003) suggested,
we assume that the union possesses full bargaining power θ = 1 and w = 0 to show our results
in the simple way5.
The firms are homogeneous with respect to productivity. Each firm adopts a constant
returns-to-scale technology where one unit of labor is turned into one unit of the final good.
The price of labor (i.e., wage) that firm i has to pay is denoted by wi, i = 0, 1.
To specify the public firm 0’s objective function SW , and each firm’s profit pii, as
SW = U −
1∑
i=0
pxi +
1∑
i=0
(pii + ui),
pii = (pi − wi)xi, i = 0, 1,
where U −∑1i=0 pxi is consumer surplus, and each firm pii is the profit of both the private and
public firm, and ui is the union’s utility for both the private and public firm. The objective
function of the public firm is the sum of consumer surplus, profit of all firms and the union’s
utility for all the firms.
This study consider that each firm can make two types of binding contracts with consumers
as described by Singh and Vives (1984) and Lo´pez (2007). Thus, a three-stage game is con-
ducted. The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, the private and public firms
5As Naylor (1998, 1999), Haucap and Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000) and Lommerud et al. (2003)
suggested, this is because wages claims are decided by the elasticity of labor demand rather than firm’s profit.
Furthermore, see also Oswald and Turnbull (1995).
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simultaneously commit to choose the strategy variable, either price or quantity i.e., a type of
contract, to set in the unionized mixed duopoly. In the second stage, if each firm’s union is al-
lowed to bargain collectively, each union bargains over its wage wi simultaneously. In the third
stage, each firm decides its optimal production knowing each union’s wage level and the type
of contract. As in Singh and Vives (1984) and Lo´pez (2007), we adopt the same assumption
that there are prohibitively high costs associated with changing the type of contract in the first
stage.
3 Bargaining in a Mixed Duopoly
3.1 Results: Fixed Contract Motives with Solutions
Before using the type of contract to apply the model and identify the point of equilibrium, four
different cases of contract games are explained. In Bertrand competition, firms set prices; in
Cournot competition, firms set quantities. In mixed cases, firm 0 sets the price and firm 1 sets
the quantity, and vice versa. Thus, it is solved by backward induction, i.e., the solution concept
used is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
3.1.1. [Competition Game in Cournot]: Assume that each firm i faces the inverse
demand functions given by pi = 1− cxj −xi. In the third stage, the public firm’s objective is to
maximize welfare which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, each firm’s profit, and each
union’s utility:
SW = U − p0x0 − p1x1 + pi1 + u1 + pi0 + u0 = U.
Given w1 for the private firm, the public firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x0
SW = U s.t. (p0 − w0)x0 ≥ 0.
The constraint implies that there is some lowerbound restriction on the public firm’s profit, i.e.,
the public firm faces a budget constraint6.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λcc, the Lagrangian equation can be written
as
L = x1 + x0 − (x
2
1 + x
2
0 + 2cx0x1)
2
+ λcc(x0 − x20 − cx1x0 − w0x0).
Taking w1 as given, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂x0
= 1− cx1 − x0 + λ(1− 2x0 − cx1 − w0) = 0 (4)
∂L
∂λcc
= 1− cx1 − x0 − w0 = 0. (5)
On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂x1
= 0⇔ x1 = 12(1− cx0 − w1). (6)
6If both unions aim at maximizing wage level simultaneously and the public firm’s union does not face the
budget constraint with a simple Stone-Geary utility function ui = (wi − w)θxi, the public firm’s union can
unlimitedly raise its wage because the optimal output level of the public firm is independent of the wage.
5
Solving the first-order conditions (5) and (6), we obtain,
x0 =
2− c− 2w0 + cw1
2− c2 , (7)
x1 =
1− c− w1 + cw0
2− c2 , (8)
λcc =
(2− c2)w0
2− c− 2w0 + cw1 . (9)
To solve for Lagrangian equation, the budget constraint is momentarily binding. We check
ex-post that the omitted this constraint is binding.
In the second stage of this case, each wage is set to maximize its firm’s union utility:
ui = xiwi. To do this, the two independent maximization problems should be considered
simultaneously. Using (7) and (8), the problem for union i is defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0(2− c− 2w0 + cw1)
2− c2 ,
max
w1
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1− c− w1 + cw0)
2− c2 .
This implies the following first-order condition
w0 =
2− c+ cw1
4
, w1 =
1− c+ cw0
2
. (10)
Straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium wage, denoted as wcci is obtained by
solving (10), and substituting wcci into (7) and (8) yields the equilibrium output x
cc
i . Thus, we
have the following result which is the same results as in Ishida and Matsushima (2008a)7.
Lemma 1 (Ishida and Matsushima, 2008a): Suppose that each firm’s union is allowed to
engage in decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium wages and output levels are given by
wcc0 =
4− c− c2
8− c2 , w
cc
1 =
4− 2c− c2
8− c2 ;
xcc0 =
2(4− c− c2)
(2− c2)(8− c2) , x
cc
1 =
4− 2c− c2
(2− c2)(8− c2) .
Finally, noting that SW cc = U cc and picc1 , we can compute the social welfare and private firm’s
profit, SW cc and picc1 as follows;
SW cc =
304− 144c− 256c2 + 92c3 + 67c4 − 12c5 − 6c6
2(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 (11)
picc1 =
(4− 2c− c2)2
(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 . (12)
3.1.2. [Competition Game in Bertrand]; Consider that firm i faces the following direct
demand function
xi =
(1− c) + cpj − pi
1− c2 .
7In Ishida and Matsushima (2008a), the calculation of λcc = (2−c
2)w0
2c−2w0+cw1 is not correct. However, we can check
that substituting lemma 1 into (9) yields λcc = 2(1+c)(4−3c)+c
2(c+c2)
8−2c > 0, which the budget constraint is binding.
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In the third stage, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price
as a best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The
public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
p0
U =
(1− c) + cp1 − p0
1− c2 +
(1− c) + cp0 − p1
1− c2
− 1
2
{
[(1− c) + cp1 − p0]2 + [(1− c) + cp0 − p1]2 + 2c[(1− c) + cp0 − p1][(1− c) + cp1 − p0]
(1− c2)2
}
s.t.
(p0 − w0)[(1− c) + cp1 − p0]
1− c2 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λbb and repeating the same process as in
Competition Game in Cournot yields the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian equation with
respect to λbb and p0:
∂L
∂p0
= 0⇔ λbb = (3− 2c)c
2 + (2− 4c2)p0 + (2c3 − 2c)p1 − 2c2(1− c)
2(1− c+ cp1 − p0)(1− c2) , (13)
∂L
∂λbb
= p0 − w0 = 0. (14)
On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇔ p1 = 1− c+ cp0 + w12 . (15)
By using xi and solving the these two equations (14) and (15) problems yields
x0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (16)
x1 =
1− c− w1 + cw0
2(1− c2) . (17)
In the second stage of this case, each wage is set to maximize the its own firm’s union:
ui = xiwi. In the analysis that follows, we again focus on the union’s maximization problem.
Using (16) and (17), the problems for union i are defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0[(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0]
2(1− c2) , (18)
max
wi
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1− c− w1 + cw0)
2(1− c2) . (19)
The best reply functions for the public firm 0 and the private firm 1 are w0 =
(1−c)(2+c)+cw1
2(2−c2)
and w1 = 1−c+cw02 , respectively. Thus, straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium
wage, denoted as wbbi is obtained by maximizing (18) and (19), and substituting w
bb
i into (16)
and (17) yields the equilibrium output xbbi and price p
bb
i . Thus, we have the following result.
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Lemma 2: Suppose that each firm’s union is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining.
Then, the equilibrium wage, output and price levels are given by
wbb0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , w
bb
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
8− 5c2 ;
xbb0 =
8− 2c− 10c2 + c3 + 3c4
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) , x
bb
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) ;
pbb0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , p
bb
1 =
12− 6c− 9c2 + 3c3
2(8− 5c2) .
Substituting lemma 2 into (13) then we have
λbb =
(1− c2)(8− 2c− 10c2 + c3 + 3c4)
16 + 4c2 + 38c3 + 6c6 − 28c− 4c4 − 18c5 > 0
which shows that the budget constraint is binding. Finally, noting that SW bb = U bb and pibb1 ,
we can compute the social welfare and private firm’s profit as SW bb and pibb1 respectively;
SW bb =
304− 144c− 844c2 + 316c3 + 795c4 − 224c5 − 330c6 + 51c7 + 48c8
8[(1− c2)(8− 5c2)]2 , (20)
pibb1 =
(4− 2c− 3c2 + c3)2
4(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 . (21)
3.1.3. [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity]: Let firm 0 optimally choose its price
as a best response to any quantity chosen private firm 1, and let private firm 1 optimally choose
its quantity as a best response to any price chosen public firm 0. The demand function that
each firm i faces are given by
x0 = 1− cx1 − p0 and p1 = 1− c+ cp0 − (1− c2)x1. (22)
In stage three, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price as a
best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The public
firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
p0
U = 1− cx1 − p0 + x1 − 12[(1− cx1 − p0)
2 + x21 + 2cx1(1− cx1 − p0)]
s.t. (p0 − w0)(1− cx1 − p0) ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λbc and repeating the same process as in
previous cases yields the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian equation with respect to p0
and λbc:
∂L
∂p0
= −p0 + λbc(1− cx1 − 2p0 + w0) = 0, (23)
∂L
∂λbc
= p0 − w0 = 0. (24)
In the third stage of this case, we obtain the pair (x1, p0) written as
x1 =
1− c+ cp0 − w1
2(1− c2) , (25)
p0 = w0. (26)
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Substituting the pair (x1, p0) into the pair (x0, p1) yields
x0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (27)
p1 =
1− c+ cw0 + w1
2
. (28)
Then, optimal wages are set to maximize union’s firm including the public union’s utility:
u = xiui. The best reply functions for the private firm 1 and the public firm 0 are as follows.
w1 =
1− c+ cw0
2
and w0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1
2(2− c2) .
Straightforward computation yields the same results as in lemma 2 since best reply functions
are the same, i.e., (16) equals to (27) and (17) equals to (25). Thus, wbci = w
bb
i , x
bc
i = x
bb
i
and pbci = p
bb
i . Therefore, we obtain the same social welfare and the private firm’s profit, i.e.,
SW bc = SW bb and pibc1 = pi
bb
1 . Substituting equilibrium values into (23) yields
λbc =
pbc0
1− cx1 − 2pbc0 + wbc0
=
2(1− c2)(4− c− 3c2)
8− 2c− 10c2 + c3 + 3c4 > 0. (29)
3.1.4. [Firm 1 sets price, firm 0 sets quantity]: Let firm 1 optimally choose its price
as a best response to any quantity chosen private firm 0, and let private firm 0 optimally choose
its quantity as a best response to any price chosen public firm 1. The demand function that
each firm i faces is given by
x1 = 1− cx0 − p1 and p0 = 1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0. (30)
Thus, the public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
x0
U = 1− cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1− cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 + 2cx0(1− cx0 − p1)]
2
s.t. [1− c+ cp1 − x0(1− c2)− w0]x0 ≥ 0
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λcb, the Lagrangian equation can be written as
L = 1− cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1− cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 + 2cx0(1− cx0 − p1)]
2
+ λcbx0[1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0].
Taking wi as given, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂x0
= −x0 − c2x0 + 2cx0 − 2cp0 + p1 + λcb[1− c+ cp1 + 2c2x0 − w0] = 0, (31)
∂L
∂λcb
= 1− c+ cp1 − 2(1− c2)x0 − w0 = 0. (32)
In the second stage of this case, from profit and social welfare optimization for each firm, we
obtain the pair (p1, x0) as
p1 =
1 + w1 − cx0
2
and x0 =
1− c+ cp1 − w0
1− c2 . (33)
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Substituting (p1, x0) into (30) yields
p1 =
1− c+ w1 − c2w1 + cw0
2− c2 and x0 =
2− c− 2w0 + cw1
2− c2 . (34)
In addition, substituting p1 into x1 yields
x1 =
1− c+ cw0 − w1
2− c2 . (35)
Then, optimal wages are set to maximize union’s firm including the public union’s utility:
u = xiui. This implies the following first-order condition
wcb0 =
4− c− c2
8− c2 , w
cb
0 =
4− 2c− c2
8− c2 .
Thus,
pcb0 =
8− 2c− 6c2 + c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) , p
cb
1 =
12− 6c− 7c2 + 2c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) .
Similar to the case of 3.1.3. [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity], straightforward com-
putation yields the same results as in lemma 1 since best reply functions in lemma 1 equal to
(34) and (35). Thus, wcci = w
cb
i and x
cc
i = x
cb
i . Therefore, we obtain the same social welfare and
the private firm’s profit, i.e., SW cc = SW cb and picc1 = pi
cb
1 . Substituting equilibrium values into
(31) then we have
λcb =
x0(1− c)2 + 2cp0 − p1
1− c+ cp1 + 2c2x0 − w0 =
−4 + 6c+ 13c2 − 26c3 − c4 + 2c5
−8− 6c2 + 2c+ 2c3 + 2c4 > 0.
3.2 Comparative Statics for Social Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly
Having derived the equilibriums for four fixed types of contracts and social welfare levels in the
previous subsection, the type of contract can be determined endogenously by taking each social
welfare level and each private firm’s profit as givens.
In order to employ the three-stage game, let “C” and “B” represent, respectively, Cournot
and Bertrand competition with regard to each firm’s choice. In this subsection, the SPNE will
be found in the first stage for any given pair of competitions. Thus, the payoff matrix for the
contract game can be represented by the following Table 1.
Table 1: Contract Game
Firm 0
Firm 1
C B
C picc1 , SW
cc pibc1 , SW
bc
B picb1 , SW
cb pibb1 , SW
bb
Since comparing each SWlm, lm = cc, cb, bb, bc in Table 1 becomes complicated, so we need
to use numerical examples to illustrate the impact of the degree of substitutability.
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Table 2: Numerical Examples in Contract Game
value of c SW bb = SW bc SW cc = SW cb
...
...
...
0.2821 0.530495786 0.530493668
0.2822 0.530476688 0.530476015
0.2823 0.53045759 0.530458364
0.2824 0.530438492 0.530440716
0.2825 0.530419394 0.530423071
...
...
...
Using this computation, numerical analysis shows that social welfare is greater with Bertrand
competition when c ≤ 0.2823. Hence the cutoff level cˆ ; 0.2823 such that SW bb = SW bc >
SW cc = SW cb when c ≤ cˆ ; 0.2823. We can therefore show that SW bb = SW bc > SW cc =
SW cb if the goods are substitutes for c ≤ cˆ ; 0.2823. Thus, for the public firm 0, choos-
ing Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) is strictly dominated by choosing Cournot (respectively,
Bertrand). If c > cˆ (respectively, c ≤ cˆ), so the public firm 0 will not choose a Bertrand (re-
spectively, Cournot) type of contract. Clearly, there are multiple sustained SPNEs in this stage:
(C, C) and (C, B) if c > cˆ since pibb1 = pi
bc
1 and pi
cc
1 = pi
cb
1 . Otherwise it would be (B, B) and (B,
C). Multiple SPNEs of the three-stage game in a mixed duopoly are found and stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that goods are substitutes and all firms’ unions are allowed to use
decentralized bargaining. In that case, the public firm chooses a Bertrand type of contract and
the private firm chooses either a Bertrand or a Cournot type of contract if c ≤ cˆ ; 0.2823 in the
first stage. Otherwise, the public firm chooses a Cournot type of contract and the private firm
chooses either a Bertrand or Cournot type of contract if c > cˆ in the first stage.
Restricting attention to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the three-stage game, one
significant result can be derived from Proposition 1: only public firm chooses a type of contract
depending on the degree of substitutability in the equilibrium. The sustaining of multiple SPNEs
from pibb1 = pi
bc
1 and pi
cc
1 = pi
cb
1 plays an important role in the derivation of the result. Moreover,
such a choice of strategic commitment by public firm can worsen or improve social welfare when
all firms choose different types of contracts, since there is a dominant strategy for the public firm
to choose a Bertrand or Cournot type of contract that is contingent on the value of c, and there
is not a dominant strategy for the private firm. Hence, when goods are substitutes, Bertrand
(respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot (respectively,
Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small (respectively, large),
i.e., c ≤ cˆ (respectively, c > cˆ). This result contrasts with Singh and Vives’ conclusion (1984)
in the sense that, in the setting of Singh and Vives (1984), in which the dominant strategy for
the private firm in a pure duopoly is to choose the quantity contract if goods are substitutes
regardless of the degree of substitutablility. This will hold true in our paper if c > cˆ ; 0.2823
because we relinquish Singh and Vives’ assumption and treat the type of contract as if it exists
in a unionized mixed duopoly. Thus, private firm’s profit is determined by public firms’ choosing
the type of contract.
In this setting, the endogenous type of contract is determined by the public firm regardless
of the private firm’s choice of strategy. As a result, there is a range of c values for which it holds
that it is a dominant strategy for the public firm to choose either quantity or price contract;
hence there are multiple SPNEs in the contract stage of the game.
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The proposition 1 is in contrast to those reported by Ghosh and Mitra (2008), who analyzed
a case of comparing Counot and Bertrand competition in the mixed oligopoly without both
trade union and endogenous type of contract. Our main results show that reversal social welfare
in Cournot-Bertrand when there is sufficiently large the degree of substitutability in the contract
stage of the game. Consequently, we found that there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract
stage of the game when there is unionized mixed duopoly. Even though our result is partially
similar to the report of Ghosh and Mitra (2008) when there is sufficiently small the degree of
substitutability, we found that our main resluts differ from Ghosh and Mitra (2008) based on
the exgoneous type of contract.
4 Concluding Remarks
We investigated a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to
strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. A choice of strategic
variables was proposed endogenously in the first stage. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly,
only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of substitutability in
the equilibrium. This occurs because there is a range of substitution values for which it is a
dominant strategy for public firm to choose either quantity or price contracts. Thus, there are
multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. This result contrasts with the findings
of Singh and Vives (1984), in whose research it is a dominant strategy for private firms in a pure
duopoly to choose a quantity contract if goods are substitutes. This holds true in our paper
if the degree of substitution is relatively large. This occurs because we relinquish Singh and
Vives’ assumption and deal with the type of contract as it exists in a unionized mixed duopoly.
Thus, our paper also suggests that private firm’s profit is determined by public firm’s choice of
contract.
In conclusion, we will discuss the limitations of our paper. We have used the simplifying
assumption that private and public firms are symmetric due to identical production costs and
a decentralized unionization structure. By making these assumptions, we neglected to take into
account any cost difference that may arise due to the mixed bargaining that occurs between
private and public firms. It is worth noting that the centralized (or, conversely, decentralized)
wage setting process assumes that the centralized (or, conversely, decentralized) union sets a
single (or, conversely, different) wage for all firms when public firms are less efficient than pri-
vate firms. Thus, this paper does not investigate whether or not the degree of centralization of
union bargaining matters for private firms when choosing different bargaining regimes and using
strategic variables. Moreover, we did not extend the model to consider a situation where the
public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. Also, in this paper we do
not analyze the policy analysis to privatization; in addition, a broader range of policies – such
as such as lump-sum, taxation, and subsidies – is worth considering. Extending our model to
these direction remains for future research.
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